Diplomat Foreign Desk
DAMASCUS: Syria’s Interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa – formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani – is reportedly in negotiations with Beijing over the extradition of hundreds of foreign fighters (Uyghurs and Tajik).
These fighters had joined Sharaa’s group in mid 2014 to fight against the previous Govt in Syria. However, they are in trouble now as many of them have reportedly been detained in various areas by Sharra’s fighters with whom they fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the Asad regime in Syria.
The talks center on members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) – composed largely of ethnic Uyghurs – as well as Tajik and other Central Asian militants who have been entrenched in northern Syria for over a decade.
Beijing’s Ultimatum:
For China, the presence of an estimated 3,500 to 4,000 battle-hardened Uyghur fighters in Syria represents a significant national security threat. Beijing has long classified the TIP as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a terrorist organization.
Recent diplomatic cables suggest that China has made the handover of these fighters a “security prerequisite” before it fully commits to Syria’s massive post-war reconstruction projects.
While the Syrian Foreign Ministry has officially denied reports of an immediate bulk transfer, diplomatic sources indicate that Damascus has tentatively agreed to hand-over approximately 400 fighters in initial “batches” to signal cooperation. None of them so far has been handed over. It is to be seen, if the deal materializes or not.
Al-Sharaa’s Strategic Tightrope:
President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who transitioned from a jihadist commander to a transitional statesman following the ousting of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, is walking a political tightrope.
International Legitimacy:
To shed Syria’s “pariah state” status and lift remaining UN sanctions, Al-Sharaa must prove that Syrian soil will no longer be a haven for transnational militancy.
Domestic Stability:
Many of these foreign fighters were instrumental in the rebel offensive that toppled the previous regime. Handing them over to China or their respective Central Asian home countries (like Tajikistan) risks a backlash from hardline factions within the Syrian military.
The “84th Division” Complication: A significant number of these militants have reportedly been integrated into the 84th Division of the Syrian Army. Beijing has explicitly rejected this integration, demanding their removal and extradition instead.
Tajik and Turkish Connection:
Beyond the Uyghur population, the negotiations reportedly include Tajik militants linked to regional extremist groups. Tajikistan has been vocal about the return of its citizens to face trial, fearing they could eventually return to destabilize Central Asia.
Meanwhile, Turkey plays a pivotal role as a mediator. Given Ankara’s historical influence over the rebel groups in northern Syria and its own complex relationship with the Uyghur diaspora, any deal to move these fighters out of Syria likely requires Turkish logistical support and tacit approval.
As 2025 draws to a close, the “foreign fighter problem” remains the primary obstacle to Syria’s full reintegration into the global economy. If Al-Sharaa proceeds with the handovers, it could unlock billions in Chinese investment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, it also sets a precedent for how the new Syria will handle its former brothers-in-arms – a decision that will define the stability of the Levant for years to come.
